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User-chosen passwords reflecting common strategies and patterns ease memorization but o↵er uncertain and often weak security, while system-assigned passwords provide higher security guarantee but
su↵er from poor memorability. We thus examine the technique to enhance password memorability that
incorporates a scientific understanding of long-term memory. In particular, we examine the efficacy of
providing users with verbal cues—real-life facts corresponding to system-assigned keywords. We also
explore the usability gain of including images related to the keywords along with verbal cues. In our
multi-session lab study with 52 participants, textual recognition-based scheme o↵ering verbal cues had a
significantly higher login success rate (94.23%) compared to the control condition, i.e., textual recognition
without verbal cues (61.54%). We found that when users were provided with verbal cues, adding images
contributed to faster recognition of the assigned keywords, and thus had an overall improvement in usability. So, we conducted a field study with 54 participants to further examine the usability of graphical
recognition-based scheme o↵ering verbal cues, which showed an average login success rate of 98% in a
real-life setting and an overall improvement in login performance with more login sessions. These findings
show a promising research direction to gain high memorability for system-assigned passwords.
Keywords: Usable security; System-assigned password; Memorability; Lab study; Field study.

1.

Introduction

Traditional user-chosen textual passwords su↵er from security problems because of password reuse
and predictable patterns (Das et al. 2014; Ur et al. 2015; Jenkins et al. 2014), which is essential for
protecting and mitigating threats to the information assets and technical resources available within
computer-based systems (Crossler et al. 2013; Vu et al. 2007; Lowry, Dinev, and Willison 2017).
Users bear the responsibility of ensuring the security of their account by creating a password that
should be chosen with creativity and intelligence to achieve satisfactory security and memorability.
Many users compromise on security with weak but memorable passwords. Policies requiring users
to create longer passwords with di↵erent character types do not necessarily lead to more secure
passwords, but they do adversely a↵ect memorability in some cases (Shay et al. 2014; Vu et al.
2007; Campbell, Kleeman, and Ma 2007).
Studies in psychology have shown that recognition, such as identifying an assigned picture from
a set, is an easier memory task than recall (Tulving and Watkins 1973; Anderson and Bower
1972; Wickelgren and Norman 1966). Inspired by these findings, researchers have proposed and
examined recognition-based authentication schemes as alternatives to pure recall-based schemes
(e.g., traditional textual password) in hopes that by reducing the memory burden on users, more
secure passwords can be generated. Wright et al. (2012) implemented the concept of recognition
for a text-based scheme, where users are shown several portfolios of keywords (e.g., “Cheetah,”
“Mango,” “Camera,” etc.), and one keyword per portfolio serves as the authentication secret that
they have to recognize during login. Passfaces (Authentication 2004) is an example of a graphical
recognition-based scheme that is now commercially available and deployed by many large websites.1
To ensure security, the commercial Passfaces (Authentication 2004) product assigns a random
image for each portfolio instead of allowing users to choose. With system-assigned passwords,
the user does not have to guess whether a password is secure, and the system can ensure that
all passwords o↵er the desired level of security. Additionally, while password reuse could pose a
serious security threat (Das et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2014), using system-assigned passwords
ensures that users do not reuse a password (or modification thereof) already used on another
account. Unfortunately, it is difficult for most people to memorize system-assigned passwords for
both textual (Wright, Patrick, and Biddle 2012) and graphical recognition (Everitt et al. 2009).
Thus, it still remains a critical challenge to design an authentication scheme that o↵ers satisfactory
1 http://www.realuser.com/

shows testimonials about Passfaces from customers.
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memorability for system-assigned random passwords.

1.1.

Contributions

The study of Wright et al. (2012) anticipated that showing the keywords in the same position
whenever a portfolio is loaded would improve the memorability for recognition-based password
schemes, and suggested the approach to be examined in future work. We adopt the suggestion of
Wright et al. (2012) to design our study conditions by showing the keywords in a portfolio in the
same position each time a portfolio is loaded.
We draw upon several prominent theories of cognitive psychology to enhance the memorability
of system-assigned recognition-based passwords. In particular, we examine the impact of o↵ering
verbal cues, i.e., real-life facts related to the system-assigned keywords. For example, “Cheetah is
faster than any other land animal” is a verbal cue for the keyword “Cheetah”. The use of cues
facilitates a detailed encoding that helps to transfer the authentication information (e.g., assigned
keywords) from the working memory to long-term memory at registration (Atkinson and Shi↵rin
1968), helping users recognize their keywords when logging in later. We provide a detailed discussion
on these memorization processes in §3.
To examine the impact of verbal cues in improving the memorability for textual recognition, we
design a scheme, TextV : Textual Recognition with Verbal cues, and compare it with the Control
condition that requires users remembering the assigned keywords without the help of verbal cue.
In addition, we aim to understand whether adding images related to the keywords contributes to
higher memorability than when users are provided with just verbal cues. To achieve the goal, we
design another scheme, GraphicV : Graphical Recognition with Verbal cues, and compare it with
the TextV scheme. To the best of our knowledge, no study yet has compared textual and graphical
recognition-based schemes in terms of usability.
In our within-group study with 52 participants, every participant was assigned three di↵erent
passwords, each representing one study condition. The major findings from our study include:
• In contrast to the suggestion of Wright et al. (2012), keeping the position of keywords fixed
in a portfolio did not provide a satisfactory login success rate (61.54%).
• Verbal cues made a significant contribution to improving the login success rate for textual
recognition (94.23%).
• Despite the picture superiority e↵ect (see §3), we found no significant di↵erence between
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textual and graphical recognition in terms of login success rate when both conditions included
verbal cues, although the login success rate (96.15%) for GraphicV was slightly higher than
that of TextV scheme (94.23%).
• We did find, however, a significant improvement in login time for graphical recognition (i.e.,
GraphicV) as compared to textual recognition (i.e., TextV), even though the number of
attempts for successful logins did not di↵er significantly between these conditions.
In our lab study, GraphicV scheme o↵ered an overall improvement in usability as compared
to TextV scheme, and thus, we conducted a field study to gain in-depth understanding on the
usability of this scheme. A field study o↵ers strong ecological validity and the best measure of
login performance in a realistic setting (Biddle, Chiasson, and Van Oorschot 2012). We found that
the memorability for GraphicV was satisfactory in a real-life setting with an average login success
rate of 98%. Our field study found an overall improvement in login performance with more login
sessions, including an 81% reduction in median login time to just 7 seconds by the 17th login
session.

2.

Related Work

Passwords schemes are used for user authentication in various systems, including authentication
in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) in mobile networks (Mishra 2016) and to improve security
against various types of attacks, like password guessing (Crossler et al. 2013; Bonneau 2012), phishing (Sharifi et al. 2007), and shoulder-surfing (De Luca et al. 2013; Al-Ameen, Haque, and Wright
2016). In this section, however, we limit our discussion to schemes designed for authenticating users
to their online accounts and aim to enhance guessing resilience and password-memorability.
In our literature review, we focused on knowledge-based authentication. We note that prior
work (Mishra et al. 2015) has also proposed alternatives to such schemes, like using physical tokens
(e.g., smart cards) for authentication. The extra hardware requirement adds costs, however, and
is hard to extend to multiple accounts without creating a “necklace e↵ect,” where the user must
carry an unwieldy number of tokens. Biometrics like fingerprints (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017)
can be useful for authenticating to devices, but they have the downside of not being easily updated
if stolen or damaged. For these reasons, as well as cost and ease of deployment, knowledge-based
authentication remains the dominant authentication technique for online accounts. For a more
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extensive survey of the field of password replacement schemes, we suggest the work of Bonneau et
al. (2012).

2.1.

Textual Password Schemes

Traditional user-chosen textual passwords are fraught with security problems and are especially
prone to password reuse and predictable patterns (Das et al. 2014; Campbell, Ma, and Kleeman
2011; Cazier and Medlin 2006; Jenkins et al. 2014; Ur et al. 2017). Ur et al. (2015) showed that
users have many misconceptions that contribute to creating weak passwords. For example, many
users believe that adding a special character at the end of a password makes it secure (Ur et al.
2015). Their study also showed that users could anticipate only targeted guessing attacks, believing
that it is a secure approach to use a birthday or name as a password if that information is not
available on social networking sites. More recently, Ur et al. (2016) showed that users have serious
misconceptions about the impact of basing passwords on common phrases and including digits and
keyboard patterns in passwords, which leads them to create weak and predictable authentication
secrets. As reported by Tam et al. (2010), users engage in creating weak passwords because they
do not see any immediate negative consequences to themselves.
Di↵erent password restriction policies have been deployed to get users to create stronger passwords (Campbell, Ma, and Kleeman 2011; Vu et al. 2007; Shay et al. 2014; Campbell, Kleeman, and
Ma 2007; Mayer, Kirchner, and Volkamer 2017). These studies report, however, that such policies
do not necessarily lead to more secure passwords. Worse still, they have been shown to adversely
a↵ect memorability. Due to the difficulty of remembering strong passwords, many users create weak
passwords, even when they are aware of strategies for creating a strong password (Von Zezschwitz,
De Luca, and Hussmann 2013). Zhang et al. (2009) leveraged list reduction and unique identifier
methods to improve the memorability of passwords. Even with such techniques, however, password
reuse and predictable patterns remain important unresolved issues. In a separate study, Shay et
al. (2015) found that a multi-step password-creation process that provides guidance to users is not
e↵ective enough in creating strong passwords.
While user-chosen textual passwords fail to provide adequate security, Bonneau et al. (2012)
suggested a set of usability, security, and deployability metrics that need to be addressed to provide
a viable solution to the usability-security tension in online user authentication. In their metrics,
system-assigned random password schemes are more secure than user-chosen passwords, but they
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fail to provide sufficient memorability, even when natural language words are used (Shay et al.
2012; Wright, Patrick, and Biddle 2012; Keith, Shao, and Steinbart 2009). Forget et al. (2008a;
2012) proposed the Persuasive Text Passwords (PTP) scheme as a hybrid between user-selected
and system-assigned passwords, but the memorability can be poor—as low as 25%.

2.2.

Graphical Password Schemes

Graphical password schemes can be divided into three categories (Biddle, Chiasson, and
Van Oorschot 2012) based on the kind of memory leveraged by the systems: i) Drawmetric (recallbased), ii) Locimetric (cued-recall-based), and iii) Cognometric (recognition-based). We cover these
briefly here, and we suggest the survey paper by Biddle et al. (2012) for more detail.

2.2.1.

Drawmetric

The user is asked to reproduce a drawing in this category of graphical passwords. In Draw-a-Secret
(DAS), a user draws on top of a grid, and the password is represented as the sequence of grid
squares (Mayer, Monrose, and Rubin 1999). Nali and Thorpe (2004) have shown that users choose
predictable patterns in DAS that include drawing symmetric images with 1-3 pen strokes, using grid
cell corners and lines (presumably as points of reference), and placing their drawing approximately
in the center of the grid. BDAS (Dunphy and Yan 2007) intends to reduce the amount of symmetry
in the user’s drawing by adding background images, but this may introduce other predictable
behaviors such as targeting similar areas of the images or image-specific patterns (Biddle, Chiasson,
and Van Oorschot 2012). DAS and BDAS have recall rates of no higher than 80%.

2.2.2.

Locimetric

The password schemes in this category present users with one or more images as a memory cue to
assist them in selecting their particular points on the image(s). In the Passpoints scheme (Chiasson,
Biddle, and van Oorschot 2007; Wiedenbeck et al. 2005), users select a sequence of click-points on
a single image as their password. Cued Click-Points (CCP) (Chiasson, Van Oorschot, and Biddle
2007) is a modified version of Passpoints, where users sequentially choose one click-point on each of
five images. Dirik et al. (2007) developed a model that can predict 70-80% of users’ click positions
in Passpoints. To address this issue, researchers proposed Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP),
in which a randomly-positioned viewport is shown on top of the image during password creation,
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and users select their click-point within this viewport (Forget et al. 2008b; Chiasson et al. 2012).
The memorability for PCCP was found to be 83-94%.

2.2.3.

Cognometric

In this recognition-based category of graphical passwords, the user is asked to recognize and identify
their password images from a set of distractor images. Passfaces (Authentication 2004) is the
most studied cognometric scheme as it is commercially deployed by a number of large websites.
The commercial Passfaces (Authentication 2004) product assigns a random set of faces instead of
allowing users to choose, since the research (Davis, Monrose, and Reiter 2004) has found that users
select predictable faces, biased by race, gender, and attractiveness of faces. However, Everitt et
al. (2009) show that users have difficulty in remembering system-assigned Passfaces.
Davis et al. (2004) proposed the Story scheme, in which users select a sequence of images as their
password and, to aid memorability, are encouraged to mentally construct a story to connect those
images. During login, users have to identify their images in accurate order from a panel of decoy
images. Though the user-choices in Story are found to be more varied than the face-recognitionbased scheme, the results still display some exploitable patterns, and the user study showed a
memorability rate of about 85% (Davis, Monrose, and Reiter 2004). To reduce predictability, the
Deja Vu scheme (Dhamija, Perrig et al. 2000) uses random art images instead of the images of human faces or common objects. Mihajlov et al. (2016), however, further identified the predictability
of user-choice in recognition-based graphical passwords in terms of color, shape, and category.
In the Photographic Authentication system (Pering et al. 2003), users are required to provide
their own set of digital photos during registration, such that at login, they can recognize their own
photos from decoy photos. The decoy images are randomly selected from the images collected from
other users. Pering et al. found that participants had a 90% login success rate with this scheme.
However, this scheme is likely vulnerable to the guessing-by-acquaintances attack because of the
use of user-selected personal photos (Tullis and Tedesco 2005).
In a recent study (Al-Ameen, Wright, and Scielzo 2015), the authors found satisfactory memorability by combining various cues for graphical recognition, which suggests that the use of cues
is very promising and motivates further study. In their lab experiment (Al-Ameen, Wright, and
Scielzo 2015), the authors did not examine the impact of di↵erent cues, nor did they study textual
recognition. Our deeper investigation on this issue helps to understand how humans’ cognitive abil-
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An Overview on the Security and Usability of Recognition-based Authentication
Schemes [NR: Not Reported, Photo. Auth.: Photographic Authentication]
Table 1.

Password
Scheme
Passfaces/Face
Story
Photo. Auth.
Deja Vu
Textual Recognition
TextV
GraphicV

Theoretical
Entropy (bits)
13
12
20
16
20
20
20

SystemAssigned
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Lab
Study
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Field
Study
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Login
Success Rate
72%
85%
95%
90%
61.54%
94.23%
96.15%

Login
Time (sec.)
88
NR
40
36
42.50
51
40.50

ities could be leveraged through verbal cues for enhanced memorability in system-assigned textual
recognition-based passwords. We also compare textual and graphical recognition to explore the
usability gain of accommodating images when users are provided with verbal cues and conducted
both lab and field studies to examine our scheme’s usability.
We focused on recognition-based password schemes in our study. In Table 1, we compare our
schemes with existing recognition-based password schemes that are designed for online user authentication. We note that some schemes have been evaluated through multiple studies, where the
login performance of users might vary across di↵erent studies. For the sake of simplicity in the
presentation in Table 1, we note the minimum login success rate and maximum login time of an
authentication scheme reported in any study, which also indicates the minimum usability o↵ered
by that password scheme in terms of these metrics. For example, in our lab study, the login success
rate and login time of GraphicV scheme was 96.15% and 40.50 seconds, respectively. In our field
study, the login success rate of GraphicV remained consistently 100% from the 17th session, where
the login time became 7 seconds by the 17th session. In this regard, we reported 96.15% as the
login success rate and 40.50 seconds as the login time of GraphicV scheme (see Table 1).

3.

System Design

Hlywa et al. (2011) provide a guideline to design recognition-based authentication schemes with
password-level security. We follow this guideline to design our study conditions, where the user
is assigned five keywords at registration and has to recognize each of the assigned keywords from
a distinct portfolio of 16 keywords during login. Successful authentication requires the user to
recognize all five keywords correctly. For an unsuccessful login, the user is shown an error message
at the end of the login attempt but not informed on which portfolio the mistake was made.
8

A partial screen shot of the Control condition during login. Users enter the key, a
lowercase letter shown in parentheses, in the password field (on top) to select the corresponding keyword. No two keywords share the same key. During login, users are shown five
such portfolios, where each presents a distinct set of 16 keywords including one of the five
assigned keywords.
Figure 1.

In our study, we implement three di↵erent recognition-based schemes. In Control condition, users
remember and recognize the assigned keywords without the help of verbal cues (see Figure 1). In
TextV scheme, the system o↵ers verbal cues to help users with the memorization and recognition
of the assigned keywords, where cues are shown both at registration and login (see Figure 2). In
GraphicV scheme, the system provides users with images corresponding to the keywords along with
the verbal cues (see Figure 3). In this section, we explain our design choices from the perspective
of cognitive psychology and existing password literature.

3.1.

Memory Retrieval

Users are required to perform a recognition task in our study. Researchers in psychology have
found that recognition (identifying the correct item among a set of distractors) is easier than
recall (reproducing the item from memory) (Tulving and Watkins 1973) and have developed two
main theories to explain this: Generate-recognize theory (Anderson and Bower 1972) and Strength
theory (Wickelgren and Norman 1966).
Generate-recognize theory (Anderson and Bower 1972) speculates that recall is a two-phase
process. In the generate phase, a list of candidate words is formed by searching long-term memory.
Then, in the recognize phase, the list of words is evaluated to see if they can be recognized as the
sought-out memory. According to this theory, recognition tasks do not utilize the generation phase
9

A partial screen shot of TextV scheme during login. The facts corresponding to each
keyword appear below that keyword.
Figure 2.

and are thus faster and easier to perform. Strength theory (Wickelgren and Norman 1966) states
that although recall and recognition involve the same memory task, recognition requires a lower
threshold of strength that makes it easier. The point is commonly illustrated in examples from
everyday life. For example, multiple-choice questions are frequently easier than essay questions
since the correct answer is available for recognition.

3.2.

Semantic Priming

Having a fixed set of objects in a particular place aids to augment semantic priming, which refers to
recognizing an object through its relationship with other objects around it (Authentication 2004).
Semantic priming thus eases the recognition task (Authentication 2004). For example, in Figure 3,
the clock is not only in the upper-left-hand corner each time, but it is always next to the mango and
above the dining table. This establishes a relationship between the objects and reinforces semantic
priming. Thus, in each of our study conditions, the keywords in a portfolio remain the same and
presented at a fixed position whenever a portfolio is loaded.

3.3.

Verbal Cues

We incorporate the scientific understanding of long-term memory to advance the usability properties of recognition-based authentication. According to the cognitive memory model proposed
by Atkinson and Shi↵rin (1968), any new information is transferred to short-term memory (STM)
through the sensory organs, where STM holds the information as memory codes or mental represen10

A partial screen shot of GraphicV scheme during login. Each keyword is accommodated with the corresponding image.
Figure 3.

tations of selected parts of the information. The information is transferred from STM to long-term
memory (LTM), but only if it can be further processed and encoded. This encoding helps people
remember and retrieve the processed information efficiently over an extended period. To motivate
such encoding, we examine the efficacy of providing verbal cues with the keywords.
If the system provides verbal cues, i.e., real-life facts related to the keywords, then users may
focus their attention on associating the keywords with the corresponding cues, which should help
to process and encode the information in memory and store them in the long-term memory. For
example, the keyword “Turtles” is associated with the verbal cue ‘Turtles are cold-blooded”. The
cues would also assist users in recognizing the keywords in the future and thus enhancing their
memorability.
Psychology research (Anderson and Bower 1972; Tulving and Watkins 1973) has shown that
it is difficult to remember information spontaneously without memory cues, and this suggests
that authentication schemes should provide users with cues to aid memory retrieval. Encoding
specificity theory (Tulving and Thomson 1973) postulates that the most e↵ective cues are those
that are present at the time of remembering. In TextV and GraphicV schemes, verbal cues are
provided during registration, i.e., the learning period, and also at login. Based on these findings,
we present our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1 ): The login success rate for TextV (and GraphicV), which o↵ers cues at registration and login, will be significantly higher than that for the Control, which does not.
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3.4.

Visual Memory

In GraphicV scheme, we leverage users’ visual memory, in addition to o↵ering verbal cues. Psychology research shows that the human brain is better at memorizing graphical information as
compared to textual information (Paivio 2014; Nelson, Reed, and McEvoy 1977). This is known
as the picture superiority e↵ect. Several explanations for the picture superiority e↵ect have been
proposed. The most widely accepted is dual-coding theory (Paivio 2014), which postulates that
images are encoded in human memory not only visually and remembered as images, but they are
also translated into a verbal form (as in a description) and remembered semantically. Another
explanation of picture superiority e↵ect is the sensory-semantic model (Nelson, Reed, and McEvoy
1977), which states that images are accompanied by more distinct sensory codes that allow them
to be more easily accessed than the textual information. Considering these findings and theories,
we present our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2 ): The login success rate for GraphicV, which o↵ers images, will be significantly
higher than that for the TextV scheme, which does not.

3.5.

Input Type

In existing recognition-based password schemes (Authentication 2004; Hlywa, Biddle, and Patrick
2011; Wright, Patrick, and Biddle 2012), mouse input is used to select a keyword or an image.
The study of Tari et al. (2006) showed that using keyboard input provides higher resilience to
shoulder-surfing attacks than using mouse input. So, we use keyboard input for the schemes in our
study, where a lowercase letter a-z is assigned as a key to one keyword on the page, and the user
inputs the key letter corresponding to her assigned keyword into a single-character password field
to move on to the next portfolio (see Figure 1, 2, and 3). The user-entered letter in the password
field is shown as an asterisk to reduce the risk of shoulder surfing.

4.

Study I: Lab Study

We used a within-subjects design in our lab study, which consists of three experimental conditions.
Using a within-subjects design controls for individual di↵erences and permits the use of statistically
stronger hypothesis tests. The study procedures were approved by our university’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for human subjects research.
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4.1.

Participants, Apparatus and Environment

For this experiment, we recruited 52 students (34 women, 18 men) through our university’s Psychology Research Pool. Participants came from diverse backgrounds, including majors from Nursing,
Psychology, Business, Environmental Science, Biochemistry, and Spanish Language. The age of the
participants varied between 18 to 48, with a mean age of 22. Each participant was compensated
with course credit for participation and was aware that her performance or feedback in this study
would not a↵ect the amount of compensation.
The lab studies were conducted with one participant at a time to allow the researchers to observe
the users’ interactions with the system. We created three realistic and distinct websites, including
sites for banking, email, and social networking. The sites used the images and layouts from familiar
commercial sites, and each of them was equipped with one of our three password schemes.
In our study, each of the five portfolios in a scheme consists of a unique set of keywords and
images that are not repeated in any other portfolio nor any other scheme. In other words, we did
not reuse any keywords or images. We collected the images and real-life facts (verbal cues) from
free online resources.

4.2.

Procedure

We conducted the experiment in two sessions, each lasting around 30 minutes. The second session
took place one week after the first one to test users’ memorization of the assigned passwords. A
one-week delay is larger than the maximum average interval for a user between subsequent logins
to any of her important accounts (Hayashi and Hong 2011) and is also a common interval used in
authentication studies (e.g., (Nicholson, Coventry, and Briggs 2013; Al-Ameen and Wright 2015;
Wright, Patrick, and Biddle 2012; Dunphy and Yan 2007; Al-Ameen, Wright, and Scielzo 2015)).

4.2.1.

Session 1.

After signing a consent form, the participants were given an overview of our study. Then they
performed registration for each of the three sites, each outfitted with a distinct scheme. The sites
were shown to the participants at random order during registration. After registering with each
scheme, participants performed a practice login with that scheme. They performed another practice
login with each scheme after completing registration for all of the three sites. We did not collect
data for these practice trials. They were asked not to record (e.g., write down or take a picture)
13

their authentication secrets.

4.2.2.

Session 2.

The participants returned one week after registration and logged into each of the three sites using
the assigned passwords. The sites were shown to the participants in random order, and they could
make a maximum of five attempts for a successful login. After they had finished, we conducted an
anonymous survey. Participants were then compensated and thanked for their time.

5.

Study II: Field Study

The results from our lab study show that GraphicV performed best in terms of usability. We thus
conducted a field study to further examine the usability of this scheme in a real-life setting. We
conducted this study on a class with both undergraduate and graduate students. At the beginning
of the study, the students were informed that we developed a website to let them access course
study materials and their grades on exams and assignments.2 With a projector, the experimenter
showed the students how GraphicV scheme works. The students were then asked to complete their
registration with this scheme, with each student in the class given a username. To protect against
unauthorized access, students’ usernames were pre-stored in the system so that only students in this
class could create accounts, one per username. The mean registration time for GraphicV scheme
was 265 seconds (median: 241 seconds, standard deviation: 110 seconds).
The GraphicV system was active for 74 days. Out of 64 students in this class, 54 students (10
women and 44 men with a mean age of 25) gave positive consent to use their login information
for the study and signed consent forms before participating in an anonymous paper-based survey.
They were compensated with extra credit in a class assignment for participating in this survey,
and an alternative assignment was o↵ered for those who did not want to participate. None of the
students had participated before in a password-related user study.
In this field study, the users could log in at any time from anywhere using a desktop or laptop
computer. During authentication, we started counting login time after the username had been
entered. A successful attempt required the user to correctly enter both her username and GraphicV
password. An unsuccessful attempt refers only to sessions where the username was correct, but the
2 Grades were posted in a file containing all students’ grades and anonymized by replacing names with a code given to each
student.
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GraphicV password was incorrect. We found that the participants always entered their username
correctly.
If a participant could not log in because of forgetting the password, she had to send an email to
the experimenter from her .edu email account, and in response, she would receive an email with a
link that would lead her through the registration process to relearn the system-assigned password.
Two participants were required to relearn their password within the first few days of the study.
Thereafter, no participant was required to relearn her GraphicV password during the study.

6.

Lab Study Results

We use statistical tests to analyze our results and consider results comparing two conditions to be
significantly di↵erent when we find p < 0.05. When comparing two conditions where the variable
is at least ordinal, we use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the matched pairs of subjects and
a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for unpaired results. Wilcoxon tests are similar to t-tests, but
make no assumption about the distributions of the compared samples, which is appropriate to the
datasets in our conditions. Whether or not a participant successfully authenticated is a binary
measure, and so we use either a McNemar’s test (for matched pairs of subjects) or a chi-squared
test (for unpaired results) to compare login success rates between two conditions. Here, we tested
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1 ): The login success rate for TextV will be significantly higher than that for
the Control condition.
The TextV scheme o↵ers verbal cues (i.e., real-life facts related to the keyword), where cues are
shown both at registration and login. So, the users could memorize their keywords by associating
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them with the corresponding cues, which should help process and encode the information to store
them in long-term memory (see §3 for a detailed discussion). Moreover, the cues would help users
recognize the keywords in the future, which should enhance their memorability. Thus, we hypothesized that TextV scheme would have a significantly higher login success rate than the Control
condition.
Our results show that out of 52 participants in our study, 49 participants (94.23%) succeeded in
logging in using TextV, while 32 participants (61.54%) logged in successfully with the Control condition (see Figure 7). Whether or not a participant successfully authenticated is a binary measure,
so we compare login success rates between conditions using McNemar’s test. We found that the
login success rate for TextV scheme was significantly higher than that for the Control condition,
X 2 (1, N = 52) = 12.20, p < 0.01 (e↵ect size = 1.10). Thus, H1 is supported by these results.
Hypothesis 2 (H2 ): The login success rate for GraphicV will be significantly higher than that
for the TextV scheme.
In GraphicV scheme, we accommodate images corresponding to the keywords, in addition to
o↵ering verbal cues. Psychology research reveals picture superiority e↵ect showing that the human
brain is better at memorizing graphical information as compared to textual information (Paivio
2014; Nelson, Reed, and McEvoy 1977). Thus, we hypothesized that the login success rate for
GraphicV would be significantly higher than that for the TextV scheme.
We found that out of 52 participants in our study, 50 participants (96.15%) succeeded in logging
in using GraphicV scheme, and 49 participants (94.23%) logged in successfully with the TextV
scheme. The results for McNemar’s test show that there was no significant di↵erence between
TextV and GraphicV schemes in terms of login success rate, X 2 (1, N = 52) = 0, p = 1 (e↵ect size
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= 0). Hence, H2 is not supported by these results.

6.1.

Registration Time

We illustrate the results for registration time in Figure 5. We found that the median registration
times for Control, TextV, and GraphicV schemes were 48 seconds, 180 seconds, and 181 seconds,
respectively. We use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (appropriate for matched pairs of subjects) to
evaluate two schemes in terms of registration time. The results show that the registration time
for TextV (V = 0, p < 0.01; e↵ect size = 12.11) and GraphicV (V = 1, p < 0.01; e↵ect size =
12.10) were significantly higher than that for the Control condition. We did not find a significant
di↵erence in registration time between TextV and GraphicV schemes (V = 633.50, p = 0.62; e↵ect
size = 7.19).

6.2.

Login Time and Number of Attempts

In this paper, number of attempts and login time respectively refer to the required attempts and
time for successful logins only, unless otherwise specified. We do not get matched pairs of subjects
while comparing two schemes in terms of login time or number of attempts for successful logins,
Table 2.

Lab Study: Number of Attempts for Successful Logins [SD: Standard Deviation]
Study Conditions

Mean

Median

SD

Control

1.25

1

0.76

TextV

1.39

1

0.86

GraphicV

1.32

1

0.55
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Lab Study: Questionnaire responses for the usability of each of the three schemes.
Scores are out of 10. * indicates that scale was reversed. Med : Median, Mo: Mode
Table 3.

Control

TextV

GraphicV

Questions

Med

Mo

Med

Mo

Med

Mo

I could easily sign up with this scheme

5

1

7.50

10

9

10

Logging in using this scheme was easy

5.50

1

7.50

10

9

10

Passwords in this scheme are easy to remember

5

1

7

10

8

10

I could easily use this scheme every day

5

4

7

10

8

10

since some participants who logged in successfully for one scheme failed in the other scheme. So,
we use a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (appropriate for unpaired results) to evaluate two schemes
in terms of login time and the number of attempts for successful logins.

6.2.1.

Login Time.

We illustrate our results for login time in Figure 6. We found that the median login time for Control,
TextV, and GraphicV were 42.50 seconds, 51 seconds, and 40.50 seconds, respectively. The results
for Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests show that the login time for Control (W = 569.50, p < 0.05;
e↵ect size = 0.41) and GraphicV (W = 878.52, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 0.50) were significantly less
than that for the TextV scheme. We did not find a significant di↵erence in login time between
Control and GraphicV (W = 790, p = 0.93; e↵ect size = 0.02).

6.2.2.

Number of Attempts.

The mean number of attempts for a successful login was less than two for each of the three study
conditions, while the median was one in each case (see Table 2). The results for Wilcoxon-MannWhitney tests found no significant di↵erence between any pair of study conditions in terms of the
number of attempts for a successful login.

6.3.

User Feedback

We asked the participants to answer a set of 10-point Likert-scale questions (1: strong disagreement,
10: strong agreement) at the end of the second session, where a higher score indicates a more positive
result for a scheme. We illustrate the results in Table 3. Since Likert scale data are ordinal, it is
most appropriate to calculate mode and median for Likert-scale responses (Robertson 2011).
The feedback of the participants were overall positive (mode and median higher than neutral) for
18
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Field Study: Login success rate (54 participants).

TextV and GraphicV schemes, however, the majority of participants reported concern about the
usability of Control condition. The results for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (appropriate for matched
pairs of subjects) show that the user feedback was significantly better for TextV and GraphicV
schemes in comparison to the Control condition; for ease of registration: TextV-Control (V = 500,
p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 8.12), GraphicV-Control (V = 118, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 11.10), ease
of login: TextV-Control (V = 567, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 7.64), GraphicV-Control (V = 124,
p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 11.05), memorability: TextV-Control (V = 577, p < 0.05; e↵ect size =
7.57), GraphicV-Control (V = 108.50, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 11.18), and ease of everyday use:
TextV-Control (V = 672, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 6.93), GraphicV-Control (V = 27, p < 0.05; e↵ect
size = 11.88).

7.

Field Study Results

In this section, we present our results and analysis on the login performance of users with GraphicV
in a real-life setting.

7.1.

Overall Login Performance

In our field study, we recorded 1349 login sessions for 54 participants, where a single login session
(or login) by a participant may include multiple attempts to authenticate successfully. To find
the full distribution of the number of attempts needed for a successful login, we did not limit the
number of attempts a participant can make during a login session.
Participants performed 25 logins on average (median: 23, standard deviation: 13). We measured
the average login performance of each participant in her login sessions (see Figure 7 and 8) and
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Field Study: Login time.

calculated the overall login performances for all of the 54 participants over 1349 login sessions. The
overall login success rate was 98%. Users required 1.10 attempts (on average) per successful login,
and the median login time was 9 seconds (mean: 15 seconds, standard deviation: 24 seconds).
To illustrate the login performance in more detail, Figures 7 and 8 show empirical cumulative
distribution functions (ECDFs) of login performance statistics taken over the users in our study
(in Figure 7, the x-axis is shown with increasing success rates and thus appears reversed).
Figure 7 shows the login success rates among participants. GraphicV proved sufficiently memorable for nearly all of our participants. 72% of participants had a 100% login success rate and 94%
had at least a 90% success rate. We note that all of our participants logged in successfully within
two attempts on average.
The performance for login time was more mixed. Figure 8 shows the average login time among
participants. The mean login time was 15 seconds or less for 48% of participants and 20 seconds or
less for 69% of participants. The median login time was 5 seconds or less for 37% of participants,
10 seconds or less for 54% of participants, and 20 seconds or less for 83% of participants.

7.2.

Training E↵ects

To determine the extent of any training e↵ects for GraphicV users in a real-world setting, we
analyzed the change in login performance over login sessions. We illustrate the results at xth login
session (x = 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, 25, 29, 33), where there are three login sessions between each value of
x. Here, we consider up to the 33rd login session, since using the higher values of x would make for
a rather small sample size (e.g., 7 users for x = 41).
We note that the sample size shrinks for each successive value of x > 5 (see Table 4). As we are
looking for a training e↵ect, we may be concerned about the remaining population of users being
more adept at using the system than those who have stopped logging in. Our results, however, show
that the number of login sessions performed by a participant did not have a strong correlation with
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Table 4.

Field Study: Number of participants in the xth login session.
x

1

5

9

13

17

21

25

29

33

Participants

54

54

52

44

38

34

22

15

13

her login success rate (r = 0.37).
In our field study, the login success rate and the number of attempts for successful logins were
satisfactory right from the first login session, and thus, we see minimal training e↵ects on these
metrics of login performance. In particular, the login success rate was 96% in the first login session,
which stayed above 96% in the subsequent login sessions and remained consistently 100% from the
17th session. Also, for all login sessions, the mean number of attempts for successful login was less
than 1.40 and the median number of attempts was 1.
The training e↵ect was most prominent for login time as shown in Figure 9. A given (x, y) point
in Figure 9 represents the average login performance (y) of the participants calculated over the
xth login session of each individual. Note that the xth login session of any given participant likely
occurred at a di↵erent time than that of other participants. The number of participants varied for
di↵erent values of x (login session), since the participants performed di↵erent numbers of logins.
Table 4 represents the number of participants in each of xth login sessions.
As shown in Figure 9, the median login time was 37 seconds in the first login session, which
decreased to 13 seconds in the 5th login session and reduced to 7 seconds in the 17th login session,
an 81% reduction. The mean and median login times decreased over the login sessions, where we
find an exception for mean login time at the 13th login session.
By comparing login times for pairs of sessions, we can apply significance tests to find significant
improvements due to training e↵ects. Below, we report results for pairs of sessions (i, j), where a
login time being significantly shorter in the j th session than in the ith session also means that it
was shorter in later sessions k > j. Using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests,3 we find the following
3 Wilcoxon

tests are similar to t-tests, but make no assumption about the distributions of the compared samples, which is
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pairs to have significantly di↵erent login times: 1st and 5th (W = 2313, p < 0.01; e↵ect size = 1.55),
5th and 17th (W = 1265, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 0.49), 9th and 21st (W = 1095, p < 0.05; e↵ect size
= 0.46), 13th and 25th (W = 677, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 0.75), 17th and 33rd (W = 347, p < 0.05;
e↵ect size = 0.64), 21st and 33rd (W = 315, p < 0.05; e↵ect size = 0.69). Our analysis suggests that
although most of the performance improvement occurs in the first few sessions, users continue to
get moderately faster at logging in even after 21 sessions.

8.

Study III: A Small-scale Field Study

In this section, we report on a pilot field study that we conducted for a 56-bit version of the
GraphicV scheme. A scheme o↵ering 56-bit passwords, also called cryptographic passwords (Biddle,
Chiasson, and Van Oorschot 2012; Bonneau and Schechter 2014), provides much greater resistance
against guessing than the 20-bit version of the scheme. This higher level of protection is important
for high-stakes scenarios, such as a password for enterprise login or as a master key to protect
other credentials, e.g., in a password manager (Bonneau and Schechter 2014). We note that 20
bits is considered sufficient against online guessing attacks, which is sufficient protection for most
uses (Florêncio, Herley, and Van Oorschot 2014).
In our future work, we would conduct a large-scale field study on GraphicV scheme o↵ering 56
bits of entropy, where users are required to recognize 14 images, each from a distinct portfolio of
16 images. To understand this scheme’s potential in providing cryptographic security and identify
the scope for improvement before conducting a large-scale study, we conducted a small-scale field
study on a graduate class with 12 students. The study procedure was the same as in Study II, and
all of the 12 students agreed to participate in this study. One student took part in both of our field
studies.
The study continued for 43 days, in which we recorded 499 login sessions. The overall login
success rate was 98%. Users required 1.10 attempts on average per successful login, while the
median login time was 29 seconds. In this case, the median login time was less than 15 seconds for
33% of participants and 25 seconds or less for 42% of participants. We found an improvement in
login time with more login sessions, where the median login decreased to 15 seconds by the 33rd
login session, a 75% reduction compared to the median login time in the first session.
The results of this study demonstrate that GraphicV o↵ering cryptographic strength has the
appropriate to the datasets in our conditions.
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potential to be further studied in future work, though it requires further attention for improvements
in login time.

9.

Discussion

In this section, we highlight the impact of verbal and graphical cues based on our findings in the
lab study. We then discuss the deployment of our scheme in a real-life setting, training e↵ects,
and amenability to lockout rules, as supported by the results of our field study. We conclude this
section by noting the limitations of our study and pointing to the scopes of future work.

9.1.

Impact of Verbal Cues

We accommodate the scientific understanding of long-term memory to improve the memorability of
system-assigned recognition-based passwords. As noted by Atkinson and Shi↵rin (1968), any new
information is transferred from short-term memory to long-term memory when it is duly processed
and encoded. In our study, we explored the impact of verbal cues for an elaborate encoding of
authentication information to ease recognition during login. As we compared TextV scheme with
the Control condition, our results showed a significant improvement in the login success rate when
users were provided with verbal cues to aid textual recognition.
During registration with TextV and GraphicV schemes, the participants may have learned the
assigned keywords by correlating them with the verbal cues. This then assisted them with the
elaborate processing of the authentication information and contributed to the higher registration
time compared to the Control condition. No significant di↵erence was found between TextV and
GraphicV schemes in terms of registration time.

9.2.

Impact of Graphical Cues

We design GraphicV scheme to examine the picture superiority e↵ect when users are provided
with verbal cues. As we compared TextV with GraphicV scheme, our results found no significant
di↵erence in the login success rate. The login time for GraphicV was significantly less than that for
TextV scheme, although we found no significant di↵erence in the number of attempts for successful
logins. Thus, we infer that when verbal cues are provided, accommodating images with the keywords
might not contribute to gain a significant improvement in the login success rate but aids users with
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faster recognition of the keywords, and so on, to reduce the login time.

9.3.

Deployment in a Real-life Setting

As pointed out by Biddle et al. (2012), a field study o↵ers strong ecological validity and the best
measure of login performance in a realistic setting. Our field study shows a satisfactory memorability for GraphicV with an overall login success rate of 98%.
The deployment of a secure and memorable authentication scheme is important not only for
the everyday computer and Internet usage of people (Al-Ameen and Kocabas 2020; Boss et al.
2015), but also to provide security for emerging technologies (Roman, Zhou, and Lopez 2013),
maintain security and privacy in information management systems (Silic, Barlow, and Back 2017;
Chatterjee, Sarker, and Valacich 2015), o↵er secure collaboration among professionals in sensitive
profession (Watkins et al. 2016; McGregor et al. 2017; Watkins et al. 2017), and to address the
general security concerns within business and organizational settings (Lowry et al. 2015; Haque
et al. 2020; Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahnila 2014; Safa, Von Solms, and Furnell 2016; Dang-Pham,
Pittayachawan, and Bruno 2017). The deployment of GraphicV in a real-life scenario does not
require any change in the current authentication server compared to traditional textual passwords.
In this regard, a textual password comprising of lowercase letters (used to select system-assigned
keywords) would be stored at the server for each user. At the client-end, users do not need to
memorize the characters used to select the keyword; rather, they could remember the systemassigned keyword with the help of given memory cues. During authentication, users recognize the
keywords and select them by entering the corresponding lowercase letters that remain fixed across
the login sessions.

9.4.

Training e↵ect

Since the prior field studies on system-assigned passwords did not present a detailed analysis of
the training e↵ect, it remains of particular interest to the research community to learn how login
performances change over login sessions in a long-term field study. In our field study, the login
success rate and the number of attempts for successful logins were satisfactory right from the first
login session, while training e↵ects played an important role in the improvement of login time with
more login sessions.
Our field study found an overall improvement in login performance with more login sessions,
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including an 81% reduction in median login time to just 7 seconds by the 17th login session, while
the login success rate remained consistently 100% from the 17th session. So, it is clear that studying
training e↵ects in a field study provides a deeper understanding on the usability of a scheme.
Although it is difficult to remember a set of random letters (Al-Ameen, Haque, and Wright
2014), with the regular use of GraphicV, meaning repeatedly entering in the same letters, it is
possible that participants may remember the letters as well, due to training e↵ect. To know more
about this, we asked participants to write down the letters in a paper at the end of study, where
about half (44%) of the participants were able to correctly recall all five letters that they had to
type for selecting their keywords. It is not clear, though, if the participants memorized the letters
with regular entry or put additional e↵ort into memorization. We now plan to conduct a study to
investigate deeper into this issue.

9.5.

Lockout rules

Lockout rules (Florêncio, Herley, and Coskun 2007) are implemented in many systems to protect
against online guessing attacks. To implement a lockout rule that is both secure and convenient for
legitimate users, it is important to figure out the number of attempts an actual user would usually
require to log in successfully. Our field study gives insight into this issue, as we found that 100% of
participants made, at most, two attempts on average to authenticate successfully. Thus, GraphicV
is amenable to reasonable lockout rules.

9.6.

Limitations and Future Work

In our studies, most of the participants were young, and all were university educated, which may
not generalize to the entire population. However, they are still representative of a large number of
frequent Web users. In our lab study, we had 52 participants from diverse majors, which we believe
provides a suitable sample size for a lab study as compared to the prior studies on password
memorability (Thorpe, MacRae, and Salehi-Abari 2013; Chiasson et al. 2012; Al-Ameen, Wright,
and Scielzo 2015; Chiasson, Van Oorschot, and Biddle 2007; Al-Ameen, Haque, and Wright 2014).
In our field study, given that the participants performed a real-life task that mattered in their
specific situation, the task had reasonable ecological validity. Now that our results for field study
with young participants show promise, we would examine the usability of GraphicV scheme for
senior users in our future work. It is not yet clear how our scheme would perform for people with
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cognitive limitations (e.g., learning disabilities). So, in our future work, we would evaluate this
scheme for people with learning disabilities to better understand its usability for the broadest
possible set of users.

10.

Conclusion

System-assigned recognition-based passwords (e.g., Passfaces (Authentication 2004)) are now commercially available and deployed by a number of large websites. They fail, however, to gain satisfactory memorability (Everitt et al. 2009), since it is difficult for most people to memorize systemassigned passwords. Our study explores a promising direction to improve memorability for these
passwords by leveraging humans’ cognitive abilities through verbal cues, and we present a comparison between textual and graphical recognition to understand the underlying usability gain of
adding images when users are provided with such memory cues.
We found that verbal cues played a significant role in improving the login success rate for
textual recognition, and adding images contributed to a significant improvement in login time.
The GraphicV scheme, which performed best in terms of usability in our lab study, was further
evaluated through a field study. The memorability for GraphicV was satisfactory in a real-life
setting, while the login time significantly improved with more login sessions because of training
e↵ects. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first field study to explore training e↵ects on the
login performance of a system-assigned recognition-based password scheme.
Finally, in our pilot study on GraphicV of cryptographic-strength, we found that there is potential for high login success and moderate login times even for high-security applications. These findings point towards a promising future research direction in leveraging humans’ cognitive strength
through memory cues in gaining high memorability for system-assigned random passwords.
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Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire
Lab Study:
Q. What is you gender?
Q. What is your age?
Q. What is your major?
Participants were shown the following 10-point Likert-scale questions (1: Strongly Disagree, 10:
Strongly Agree) after their login attempts with each of the three schemes in Session 2.
a. I could easily sign up with this scheme.
b. Logging in using this scheme was easy.
c. Passwords in this scheme are easy to remember.
d. I could easily use this scheme every day.
Field Study:
Q. What is you gender?
Q. What is your age?
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